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I. INTRODUCTION 
The felony-murder1 rule challenges traditional notions of 
culpability by allowing courts to find a homicide where there is no 
corresponding homicidal intent.2  At early common law, the rule 
 
        †  J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., English, 
Boston College, 1997. 
 1. “Felony murder” is a “[m]urder that occurs during the commission of a 
felony (esp. a serious one).”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999).  
 2. See State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 881 (Minn. 1992) (citing 2 WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (1986)) 
(describing the felony murder rule’s function as “imputing malice where there was 
no specific intent to kill”); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 64 (2003) (explaining that the 
effect of a felony-murder statute is to impute malice).  Traditionally, culpability 
has required intent.  Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted 
by intention is no provincial or transient notion.  It is as universal and 
1
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broadly held that a death resulting from the commission of a felony 
is murder.3  The criminal intent applicable to the underlying felony 
is said to transfer to the homicide; thus, an accidental death 
becomes a murder.4 
The doctrine has long been controversial.5  The public, of 
course, has little tolerance for those who would intentionally 
commit a felony, and an unwarranted death without question 
deserves punishment.6  But the conclusion that any death caused 
while attempting or committing a felony rises to murder is a brutal 
and illogical violation of what has been described as perhaps the 
most basic principle of criminal law: “criminal liability for causing a 
particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable 
mental state in respect to that result.”7  Courts tend to avoid 
 
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will 
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose 
between good and evil. 
Id. 
 3. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 2003) (citing Rudolph J. 
Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 
765 (1999) (quoting SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 947 (George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938)). 
 4. 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 147 (15th ed. 1993) (“In 
the typical case of felony murder, there is no malice in ‘fact’ with respect to the 
homicide; the malice is supplied by the ‘law.’”); cf. Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law 
Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1919 (1986) [hereinafter Reconceptua-
lization] (pointing out that within the concept of homicide, with the exception of 
manslaughter, only felony murder requires no specific mental element).  The 
Minnesota Criminal Code, for example, classifies five types of homicide.  See MINN. 
STAT. §§ 609.185-.205 (2002).  Each type describes a particular mental 
requirement.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2002) (requiring 
premeditation and intent); MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2002) (requiring 
intent without premeditation). 
 5. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980) (“Felony murder 
has never been a static, well-defined rule at common law, but throughout its 
history has been characterized by judicial reinterpretation to limit the harshness of 
the application of the rule.”). 
 6. The standard definition of a felony offense as a crime punishable by a 
year or more in prison testifies to the public will as expressed through the 
legislature. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 2 (2002) (“[S]entence of 
imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed.”).  See generally David 
Crump & Susan Waite Crump, Articles in Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 nn.18-19 (1985) (describing the BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION 
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 4-5 (1983), where the public was asked to rank the 
severity of crimes).  The author notes that some felony murders including rape- or 
robbery-homicides ranked higher than other intentional family killings.  Id. at 364. 
 7. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting Bernard E. Gegan, Criminal Homicide 
in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L. FORUM 565, 586 (1966)).  The court 
2
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applying the rule where circumstances permit,8 and the variety of 
judicial and legislative limitations testify to a growing discomfort 
with the harshness of the rule.9 
Minnesota is among the states that have decided to limit the 
application of the felony-murder rule.10  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court has, through its power of common law interpretation, wisely 
enunciated a rule that limits the reach of the doctrine to felonies 
that are inherently dangerous to life.11  The result is a rule that is 
not entirely consistent with the broader demands of the statute.  
After settling into a consistent course of rulings, the court was once 
again called upon to grapple with the controversial doctrine.12 
Although on its face the Minnesota statute applies to all but a 
few felonies,13 the Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes only 
predicate felonies that involve a “special danger to human life.”14  
In Minnesota, determining whether a felony involves a “special 
danger to human life” is critical; only those felonies that involve 
such a danger can support a felony-murder charge.15 
Determining whether a felony involves a special danger to 
human life requires consideration of two factors: (1) the nature of 
 
further reasoned, “[w]hile it is understandable that little compassion may be felt 
for the criminal whose innocent victim dies, this does not justify ignoring 
principles underlying our system of criminal law.”  Id. at 318. 
 8. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 70 (3d ed. 1982). 
 9. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316. 
 10. Most jurisdictions have limited the application of the rule either by 
statute or common law. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 
cmt. 6 (1980) (summarizing major limitations); TORCIA, supra note 4, § 149 
(describing a variety of limitations).  
 11. While Minnesota Statutes section 609.19 applies to all felonies (excepting 
specific crimes for treatment as murder in the first degree under Minnesota 
Statutes section 609.185 (2002)), the Minnesota Supreme Court only gives effect to 
the rule where the felony is inherently dangerous.  See State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 
752, 754 (Minn. 1980). 
 12. Since Nunn, the court has applied the same standard for determining 
which felonies involve some special danger to human life.  See State v. Meyers, 627 
N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 2001) (finding danger to life in the circumstances 
surrounding obstruction of justice); State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 
1992) (reiterating abstract and circumstances as the proper test); Matter of 
Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 729-30 (Minn. 1984) (finding danger to life in 
damage to property by shooting a rifle into a dwelling). 
 13. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 2 (2002).  The Minnesota rule applies to all 
felonies except particular instances of criminal sexual conduct with force or 
violence, drive-by shootings, and certain crimes committed in violation of an order 
for protection.  Id. 
 14. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 753. 
 15. Id. at 754. 
3
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the felony in the abstract (considering only the elements of the 
offense with a view to their inherent dangerousness), and (2) the 
manner in which the felony was committed (taking account of the 
particular facts and circumstances of the offense).16 
Until recently, the courts focused largely on the facts and 
circumstances of the felony under consideration, an approach that 
tended to favor application of the felony-murder rule.17  In 2003, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in State v. 
Anderson, a case that involved felon in possession18 and possession of a 
stolen firearm.19  In Anderson, the court focused its analysis exclusively 
on the felonies in the abstract, ignoring the more dangerous 
circumstances in which the felonies were committed.20  The court 
made this transition without explanation and without providing 
guidance for apportioning weight between the two considerations.21 
This Note first briefly examines the history of the felony-
murder doctrine both generally and in Minnesota.22  Second, this 
Note describes the decision and analysis in State v. Anderson, the 
latest case in Minnesota to deal with the felony-murder doctrine.23  
 
 16. See id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 547 (West Pub. Co. 1972)). 
 17. By including more activity within the scope of the analysis, the potential 
for finding danger increases.  The opposite is also true.  Viewing a felony only in 
the abstract tends to limit application of the felony-murder rule.  Compare People v. 
Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989) (holding that furnishing cocaine is not 
inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract) with State v. Randolph, 676 
S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984) (upholding heroin distribution as a proper predicate 
when viewed as committed). 
 18. MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002) (prohibiting those  adjudicated 
delinquent of a crime of violence from possessing a firearm). 
 19. MINN. STAT. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2002) (describing felony possession of a 
stolen firearm); MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subd. 3(1) (2002) (prescribing 
punishment). 
 20. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003).  The court did not 
discuss its reasons for viewing the felony only in the abstract.  See id. One possible 
explanation is that the court narrowly construed the scope of the felony.  By 
limiting the time that the felony is considered to be occurring, the court can claim 
to have taken account of the entire felony.  Compare State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 
518, 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the sale of cocaine ended at the 
point of transaction so death occurred outside of the felony) with State v. Murphy, 
380 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 1986) (finding that a killing which took place after a 
rape was within the “same continuous criminal act”).  See generally Erwin S. Barbre, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Termination of Felony for Purpose of Felony-Murder Rule, 
58 A.L.R.3d 851 (1974). 
 21. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
4
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Third, this Note concludes that in an effort to reach the right 
result, the court misapplied its previous precedent and left the 
lower courts with no clear standard for guidance in the future.24  
Finally, this Note suggests that a workable standard might be found 
in limiting the application of the rule to deaths that occur in 
furtherance of the felony.25 
II. GENERAL HISTORY 
The original formulation of the felony-murder rule stated, 
without limitation, that a death caused while perpetrating or 
attempting a felony is murder.26  The doctrine was mechanical and 
made no concessions for deaths that were caused by accident.27  
Death did not even have to be a foreseeable consequence of the 
crime.28  One commentator framed the operation of the rule most 
starkly: “[A] felony + a killing = a murder.”29  The unique and 
controversial aspect of this rule is that it regards the commission of 
a felony as conclusive evidence of homicidal malice.30 
Legal historians agree that the rule appeared first in 
commentaries rather than judicial decisions,31 but the precise 
origins of the doctrine are unclear.32  Commentators often trace 
the first manifestation of the felony-murder rule to Lord Dacres 
case in 1535.33  Lord Dacres and his hunting party agreed to 
trespass in a park to hunt and to kill anyone who opposed them.34  
 
 24. See infra Part IV.A-C. 
 25. See infra Part IV.D. 
 26. See M. Susan Doyle, Note, People v. Patterson: California’s Second Degree 
Felony-Murder Rule at “The Brink of Logical Absurdity,” 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 195, 199 
(1990) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 7.5 (1986)). 
 27. George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 413 
(1980-81). 
 28. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 67-68. 
 29. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of 
the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1994). 
 30. See Fletcher, supra note 27, at 415-16; People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 
1366 n.15 (Cal. 1971) (“The thing done having proceeded from a corrupt mind, is 
to be viewed the same, whether the corruption is of one particular form or 
another.” ) (citing People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 (1874)).  
 31. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 764 (1999). 
 32. Id. 
 33. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980). 
 34. Id. 
5
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One of the Lord’s party killed a gamekeeper who confronted him.35  
Although not physically present at the site of the killing, Lord 
Dacres was also held liable for the killing.36  Even though this case 
has been presented as one involving the felony-murder rule,37 its 
holding was based on the theory of “constructive presence,” not on 
the felony-murder rule.38  Because the hunting party had expressly 
agreed to kill anyone who opposed them, there was no need for the 
imputation of malice.39 
Whatever the original source of the rule, “the doctrine gained 
prominence with Sir Edward Coke’s statement of the rule in 
1797.”40 
If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to 
steale a deere in the park of B., shooteth at the deere, and 
by the glance of the arrow killeth a boy that is hidden in a 
bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawful, 
although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not 
of him.41 
This rule operates in direct opposition to the fundamental 
principle of criminal law that liability ought to reflect culpability.42  
A crime is typically composed of a particularized type of criminal 
intent coupled with an act.43  When the felony-murder doctrine was 
first being applied, the idea of matching a specific mindset to a 
particular crime was not nearly as developed as it is today.44  Judges 
focused more attention on the result of the felony than on the 
intent of the actor who produced the result.45  The felony-murder 
 
 35. Id. at 308. 
 36. Id. at 307-08. 
 37. Id. at 308-09. 
 38. Id. at 308. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Michael J. Roman, “Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends, Once More”: 
A Call to Reevaluate the Felony-Murder Doctrine in Wisconsin in the Wake of State v. Oimen 
and State v. Rivera, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 828 n.15 (1994). 
 41. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1797) and noting that Coke’s statements 
have been criticized as lacking authority). 
 42. Doyle, supra note 26, at 195; State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 
(Minn. 1992) (levels of criminal responsibility are based on the actor’s intent). 
 43. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 1 (5th ed. 
1995). 
 44. See Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1435. The early conception of mens rea 
necessarily was “vague and imprecise; any badness or wrongfulness qualified.”  Id. 
 45. See e.g., Gerber, supra note 31, at 765 (describing theory of “tainting,” 
whereby “if one person caused the death of another, then the killing upset the 
6
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doctrine reflected the idea that “the defendant, because he is 
committing a felony, is by hypothesis, a bad person, so that we 
should not worry too much about the difference between the bad 
results he intends and the bad results he brings about.”46 
Modern criminal codes distinguish among several degrees of 
criminal intent.  The Model Penal Code for instance, recognizes 
four types of mental states associated with liability: purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.47  As criminal law has 
evolved, “courts and commentators have come to recognize that 
the intent to commit a felony is not equivalent to the other mental 
states associated with murder.”48  The doctrine has attracted vast 
amounts of scholarly criticism, and many courts have concluded 
that “the felony murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial 
concept that deserves no extension beyond its required 
application.”49 
Where courts feel compelled to justify use of the rule, it is most 
often explained as a deterrent against the commission of felonies50 
or against killing negligently or accidentally while engaged in a 
felony.51  The value of the rule as a deterrent has also been hotly 
contested.52  Commentators point out that accidental killings, by 
their very nature, are neither planned nor susceptible to 
avoidance.53  Opponents of the rule further contend that the 
 
moral order [and] [s]ome legal response was necessary to . . . expunge the taint”). 
 46. John S. Huster, The California Courts Stray From the Felony in Felony Murder: 
What is “in Perpetration” of the Crime?, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 739, 745 (1994) (quoting 2 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(e) (1986)); see also 
Fletcher, supra note 27, at 427 (“If there is a principle . . . it is that the wrongdoer 
must run the risk that things will turn out worse than she expects.”). 
 47. Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1480 n.24 (discussing Model Penal Code 
section 2.02). 
 48. Tamu Sudduth, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder 
Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1306 (1984). 
 49. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(h) (2d ed. 1986) 
(quoting People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966)). 
 50. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451 (1985). 
 51. See id. at 450; see, e.g., State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 882-84 (Minn. 
1992) (holding that certain felonious conduct risks death and warrants 
punishment). 
 52. See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1448; Crump & Crump, supra 
note 6, at 369 (defending deterrence as a rationale for the rule). 
 53. T.B. Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, 
Note M, 64-65 (1837), excerpted in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 472-73 (6th ed. 1995).  To 
punish one who while committing a felony caused a death by pure accident gains 
7
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average felon is unlikely to know about what is basically a rule of 
evidence regarding a defendant’s mindset during the commission 
of a crime.54 
Historically, the harshness of the felony-murder doctrine was 
tempered by the limited number and extreme nature of the acts 
that were recognized as felonies.55  The rule applied to the most 
serious crimes within the social context of the time: “homicide, 
mayhem, rape, arson, robbery, burglary, larceny, prison breach, 
and rescue of a felon.”56  Both felonies and murders were 
punishable by death.57  At trial, with the same result pending, it 
made no difference under which theory one was prosecuted.58 
The rule, then, was not justified as a means to increase the 
penalty for a felony.  Instead, commentators hold that it was used 
to punish homicides that occurred in the course of an attempted 
felony.59  Because an attempted felony was punishable only as a 
misdemeanor, “the felony murder rule allowed the court to punish 
a person who attempted a felony and failed, in the same manner as 
if he had succeeded.”60 
In England, the application of the rule was limited61 until 1957 
when it was eliminated completely.62  As the number of recognized 
felonies in America has grown, the potential for creating murderers 
 
nothing for the protection of life.  Id. at 472.   If the punishment for the felony is 
too light, then the punishment should be increased.  Id. at 473.  Treating the felon 
who did the same thing, with the same intention with no more risk of causing 
death, taking no less care to avoid it, is capricious.  Id. 
 54. Crump & Crump, supra note 6, at 370 (“Deterrence is the policy most 
often recognized in the cases.  Scholars, however, tend to dismiss this rationale, 
using such arguments as the improbability that felons will know the law.”). 
 55. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 764 (“Under early English law, felonies and 
murders were both punishable by death.”). 
 56. State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (listing 
common law felonies). 
 57. Id.; Roth & Sundby, supra note 50, at 450. 
 58. See Huster, supra note 46, at 744. 
 59. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. II, vol. I, § 210.2  cmt. 6  
n.74 (1980) (“The primary use of the felony-murder rule . . . was to deal with a 
homicide that occurred in furtherance of an attempted felony that failed.”). 
 60. Id.; Roth & Sundby, supra note 50, at 450-51 (explaining the purpose for 
the rule is vague and deterrence justification is logically flawed). 
 61. English courts created two general limitations: death had to be the 
natural and probable consequence of the felony, and the felony charged had to be 
violent in nature.  Richard Brooks Holcomb, Predicate Offenses For First Degree Felony 
Murder in Virginia, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 561, 571 (2000). 
 62. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 64 n.38 (citing HOMICIDE ACT OF 1957, 
5&6 Eliz. II, c. 11, sec. 1). 
8
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out of relatively minor offenders has caused courts to limit the 
effect of the doctrine in a variety of ways.63 
A. Limitations on the Application of the Felony-Murder Rule 
There is no uniformity among the states with respect to felony-
murder.  This is partially because legislatures have promulgated a 
variety of statutes, but also because the judiciary has imposed many 
common law limitations.64  Comments to the Model Penal Code 
describe several of the methods that courts have used to limit the 
felonies to which the rule can be applied.65  These restrictions 
include: requiring that the crime, abstractly considered, be 
inherently dangerous to human life;66 that the defendant’s conduct 
in committing the felony involve a foreseeable risk to life;67 that the 
felony be independent of the homicide;68 that the act of killing be 
in furtherance of the felony;69 and giving a narrow construction to 
the period of time during which the felony is in the process of 
commission.70  All of these restrictions are aimed at avoiding 
situations where applying the rule would lead to harsh results. 
One of the earliest and most logical limitations to the felony-
murder doctrine is the requirement that the felony be inherently 
dangerous to life.71  In order to justify a murder conviction, a felon 
should at least have done something dangerous.  The goal of 
deterrence can only be served where a felon can foresee danger in 
the commission of the felony and modify his actions in light of the 
 
 63. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 45 (1991 & Supp. 2004) (citing State v. Forsman, 
260 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977)).  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 14.5(b) 
(describing limitations on felony-murder rule). 
 64. Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 1434 (“Most American jurisdictions have a 
restricted form of the rule that applies only when a felon acting in furtherance of 
one of a certain, limited group of felonies commits a lethal act that kills another 
human being.”). 
 65. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980) 
(summarizing major limitations). 
 66. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 555 (Cal. 1989).  For 
application of the felony-murder rule, most courts require that [a felony not 
specifically listed in the statute] be inherently dangerous.  TORCIA, supra note 4, § 
148. 
 67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (Mass. 1982). 
 68. See, e.g., People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580, 590 (Cal. 1969). 
 69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 495 (Pa. 1958). 
 70. See, e.g., State v. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 71. Most courts limit the felony-murder rule to inherently dangerous felonies. 
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 65. 
9
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impending risk to life.72 
As early as 1887, in the case of Regina v. Serné, the rule was 
limited by judicial instruction to situations deemed inherently 
dangerous.73  In that case, a man stood accused of arson for setting 
fire to his home and burning his wife and children to death in 
order to cheat an insurance company on the claim.74  The 
presiding judge suggested to the jury that, “instead of [allowing all 
felonies to support felony murder] it would be reasonable to say 
that any act known to be dangerous to life and likely in itself to 
cause death . . . should be murder.”75  Today, the majority of 
jurisdictions recognize inherent danger as a proper qualification 
for treatment under the rule.76 
In determining which felonies involve a danger to human life, 
two competing views have evolved.  The first view looks only to the 
elements of the felony in the abstract, and the dangerousness is 
determined by the nature of the crime.77  A theft of property, for 
example, requires only that one take possession of something that 
does not belong to him with an intent to keep it.78  When viewed in 
the abstract, a theft does not create an unacceptable risk of death 
to justify imposition of the rule.79  The second view maintains that 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission should be 
included in the analysis.80  If the theft involved returning stolen 
 
 72. Sudduth, supra note 48, at 1305 n.31; People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 
897 (Cal. 1984) (“We formulated this standard because ‘if the felony is not 
inherently dangerous, it is highly improbable that the potential felon will be 
deterred; he will not anticipate that injury or death might arise solely from the fact 
that he will commit the felony.’”). 
 73. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 468-70 (6th ed. 1995) (citing Regina v. Serné, 16 
Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (1887)). 
 74. Id. at 468. 
 75. Id. at 470. 
 76. It is critical to note, however, that even when limited to predicate felonies 
that are inherently dangerous, the rule still operates to turn what is essentially 
negligent or reckless activity into an intentional crime.  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980). 
 77. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 66.  In People v. Williams, California’s 
highest court ruled that the determination of danger is to be drawn from the 
“elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular ‘facts’ of the case.” 406 
P.2d 647, 650 n.5 (Cal. 1965). 
 78. A theft can occur under a variety of circumstances.  See MINN. STAT. § 
609.52 (2002 & Supp. 2003). 
 79. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 357 (Cal. 1966); LAFAVE, supra 
note 49, § 14.5 (theft felonies in abstract do not involve danger to life). 
 80. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 8, at 66. 
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merchandise for cash, while the felon was armed with a loaded 
firearm and under the influence of multiple narcotics, the result 
would be different in a jurisdiction that takes into consideration 
the facts of the case.81 
The method employed plays a major and often determinative 
role in the outcome of the test.82  Proponents of the circumstances 
test argue that the standard provides a more accurate measurement 
of the danger as it actually existed.83  Opponents insist that the 
existence of a victim makes objective determination of danger 
difficult.84  Every felony that ends in death will naturally have been 
done in a dangerous manner.85 
B. Recent History in Minnesota 
On its face, the current Minnesota statute on second-degree 
unintentional murder applies to all but a few felonies.  The statute 
states in pertinent part: 
[W]hoever does either of the following is guilty of murder 
in the second degree . . . (1) causes the death of a human 
being, without intent to effect the death of any person, 
while committing or attempting to commit a felony 
offense other than [particular sexual offenses and drive-by 
 
 81. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996). 
 82. Compare People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (Cal. 1971) (holding 
that possession of a firearm is not inherently dangerous when viewed in the 
abstract) with State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279, 285 (Kan. 1976) (holding that 
possession of a firearm is inherently dangerous under the circumstances of the 
commission). 
 83. “[I]f the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons 
accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct, then it 
would seem to make little difference whether the felony committed was dangerous 
by its very nature or merely dangerous as committed in the particular case.”  
LAFAVE, supra note 49, § 14.5(b). 
 84. Explaining the decision to view felonies in the abstract only, the 
California Supreme Court stated: 
This form of analysis is compelled because there is a killing in every case 
where the rule might potentially be applied.  If in such circumstances a 
court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to 
establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the 
court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any 
unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an 
application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead 
inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally 
hazardous.  We continue to resist such unjustifiable bootstrapping. 
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897-98 (Cal. 1984). 
 85. See id. 
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shootings].86 
Before 1981, the statute had only been applicable to felonies 
committed or attempted “upon or affecting the person whose 
death was caused.”87  A felony not committed directly upon “the 
person” would not qualify for felony-murder treatment.88  The 
effect of the language was to eliminate pure property crimes from 
the domain of the statute.89  Minnesota courts have interpreted that 
limiting language as a means of “isolat[ing] for special treatment 
those felonies that involve some special danger to human life.”90  
After 1981, when the language was removed, Minnesota retained 
the requirement that predicate felonies involve some “special 
danger to human life.”91 
In 1980, Minnesota adopted its current framework for 
resolving whether a felony is inherently dangerous and thereby 
capable of supporting a murder conviction.  In State v. Nunn, the 
court adopted the two-part special danger test that called for 
potential predicate felonies to be viewed both in the abstract and in 
the context of how they were committed.92  Significantly, the court 
gave no explicit guidance on how much weight was to be accorded 
to either consideration.93  Beginning with Nunn, however, the court 
has made a series of decisions that appear to indicate that lack of 
danger in the abstract can be overcome by dangerous 
circumstances in the commission of the offense.94 
The Nunn decision involved three young men who unlawfully 
entered a home intending to steal property.95  They were surprised 
by the resident of the home and beat him severely.96  The “beating, 
while insufficient to cause death to a healthy person,” caused the 
 
 86. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2002). 
 87. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666 
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003) (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(2) advisory 
committee’s cmt. (West 1987)). 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 370. 
 90. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 699 (quoting State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 753 
(Minn. 1980)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980). 
 93. See id. (stating only that the approach adopted considers both elements 
and circumstances). 
 94. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
 95. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 753. 
 96. Id. 
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resident to die of a heart attack.97  In Nunn, the court reasoned that 
burglary of a dwelling, although largely a crime against property, 
“always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some 
special risks to human life.”98  Thus, although burglary may not 
have been dangerous in the abstract, the fact that the burglary was 
committed on a dwelling, with an accompanying assault, created a 
special danger to life.99 
In the 1983 case State v. Back, random shots were fired upon 
cars, streetlights, and buildings using a high-powered rifle.100  The 
felony-murder rule was applied and predicated upon felony 
damage to property, a crime that viewed in the abstract does not 
jeopardize lives in its commission.101  In deciding Back, the court 
held the defendant’s conduct involved a “high degree of risk of 
bodily harm.”102  Thus, even a true property crime committed 
under dangerous circumstances may involve a danger to life and 
support a felony-murder charge.103 
Thirteen years later, in State v. Cole, the court reached a similar 
conclusion.104  The defendant, under the influence of multiple 
drugs and carrying a loaded gun, entered a department store 
intending to return stolen merchandise for money.105  The crime of 
theft, when exhibiting a danger to life as committed, was an 
appropriate predicate for felony-murder.106 
In all three supreme court rulings, the dangerous 
circumstances of the predicate felony proved to be dispositive, and 




 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 754. 
 99. See id. 
 100. 341 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Minn. 1983). 
 101. Id. at 277. 
 102. Id. at 276 (quoting the district court). 
 103. Id.  The court noted that this holding was particularly significant because 
despite a legislative amendment that effectively allowed the felony-murder rule to 
encompass property offenses, the previous limitation that a special danger to 
human life be present was not abandoned.  State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 699 
(Minn. 2003) (discussing 40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 1963 advisory committee’s 
cmt. (West 2003)). 
 104. 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996). 
 105. Id. at 46-47. 
 106. Id. at 53. 
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III. THE ANDERSON DECISION 
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 1998, Jerret Lee Anderson was convicted of riot in the 
second degree.107  Thereafter, possession of a firearm would be a 
felony offense for Anderson.108  On February 26, 2002, Anderson 
visited Blake Rogers and a third party at Rogers’s house in 
Minneapolis.109  As the three were together in Rogers’s bedroom, 
Anderson showed both men a twelve-gauge shotgun that he 
claimed he had stolen.110 Next, Anderson passed the gun briefly to 
his two companions.111 The gun was missing its stock, and all three 
men noted that the gun was loaded.112  While Rogers bent to load 
compact discs into his stereo, Anderson pointed the gun at him.113  
The gun discharged, killing Rogers.114  Following Rogers’s death, 
the State charged Anderson with murder in the third-degree and 
second-degree felony-murder.115 
The district court dismissed the felony-murder charge for lack 
of probable cause.116  The district court erroneously compared the 
possession of a firearm in Anderson to the felony sale of cocaine in 
State v. Aarsvold,117 an earlier appellate court decision.118  In Aarsvold, 
the court considered the sale to be finished after the exchange of 
money and drugs, and the death that followed was not considered 
part of the felony.119  Comparing Anderson to Aarsvold, the district 
court concluded that while both involved a dangerous situation, 
neither involved an inherent danger to life.120  The district court 
 
 107. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 698 n.3.  The adjudication was pursuant to MINN. 
STAT. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2002 & Supp. 2003).  Id. 
 108. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2 (2002 & Supp. 2003)). 
 109. Id. at 697. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. The district court found that neither felony possession charge was a 
proper predicate offense for felony murder.  Id. (describing the procedural 
history). 
 117. 376 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 118. State v. Anderson, No. 02-2918, Dist. Ct. Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss 
at 5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2002). 
 119. Aarsvold, 376 N.W.2d at 523. 
 120. State v. Anderson, No. 02016378, Dist. Ct. Order and Mem. of Law at 6 
14
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did not address the fact that while the felony distribution of drugs 
may have ended at the point of sale, the possession in Anderson was 
still “occurring” at the time of the homicide.121 
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.122  
The State noted what it viewed as the district court’s unwarranted 
hostility toward application of the rule and the court’s “fail[ure] to 
even mention that [Anderson] aimed the weapon at the 
decedent.”123  The defense argued that Anderson’s conduct was 
merely reckless and deserved the district court’s lesser charge of 
third-degree murder.124  The court of appeals looked at the totality 
of the circumstances and found that “where a stockless firearm is 
pointed at another and discharged,” either felony can be a 
predicate for felony-murder.125  Anderson then petitioned the 
Minnesota Supreme Court for review.126 
B. The Court’s Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals 
decision.127  First, the court rejected the State’s argument that “the 
facts of the offense, as opposed to the abstract elements of the 
predicate crime,”128 determine whether a felony involves a special 
danger to human life.129  The court insisted that in addition to the 
circumstances test, it had also consistently viewed the elements of 
the felony in the abstract as a separate factor within its analysis.130  A 
 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 20, 2002). 
 121. See id. 
 122. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666 
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 123. Appellant’s Brief and App. at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043). 
 124. Respondent’s Brief and App. at 6, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043). 
 125. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 372. 
 126. State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 127. Id. at 702. 
 128. Appellant’s Brief and App. at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043). 
 129. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701 n.6 (rejecting the State’s argument); see 
Appellant’s Brief and App. at 4, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043) (argument in full).  
The State could have been correct.  Depending upon how broadly the 
circumstances are defined, they could well encompass the idea of the felony in the 
abstract.  In fact, the State argued that whether a felony is “dangerous in the 
abstract is irrelevant under the totality of the circumstances test.”  Anderson, 654 
N.W.2d at 370. 
 130. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. The court declined to consider only the 
circumstances of the felony.  The court reasoned that every felony that ends with a 
death would necessarily have been committed in a particularly dangerous way.  Id. 
at 701 n.6.  This same argument has been presented in California as the 
15
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closer look at Nunn, Back, and Cole, the cases relied upon by the 
majority for this proposition, reveals how little weight the court had 
actually accorded the abstract test in the past.131 
Second, having noted the existence of the abstract test, the 
court declared that there is “nothing about a felon’s possession of a 
firearm, or of a stolen firearm—in the abstract—that in and of itself 
involves a special danger to human life.”132  The court 
acknowledged that felons with firearms create a “dangerous 
situation.”133  But, the court continued, possession neither 
“require[s] an act of violence” nor is “death . . . the natural and 
probable consequence” of the offense.134  Finally, the court 
concluded that “[b]ecause [a] felon in possession of a firearm and 
possession of a stolen firearm are not dangerous in the abstract, 
these predicate felonies fail the special danger to human life 
standard.”135  Thus, the court dismissed the charge of felony-
murder.136 
Dissenting, Justice Gilbert called upon the majority to include 
the circumstances of Anderson’s possession within their analysis, 
stating that “[t]his is precisely the especially dangerous situation 
that the legislature [intended to cover under the statute.]”137  The 
gun was stolen, loaded, illegally possessed, pointed at the victim’s 
head, and ultimately discharged.138 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ANDERSON DECISION 
As a matter of policy, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately 
came to the right result in holding that neither possession of a 
stolen firearm nor felony possession should support a charge of 
 
justification for foreclosing consideration of the circumstances surrounding the 
felony entirely.  See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 131. See State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (involving circumstances of 
theft control); State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1983) (involving 
circumstances of damage to property control); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 
(Minn. 1980) (involving circumstances of burglary control over elements in the 
abstract). 
 132. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701.  California courts have employed the same 
standard and reached similar conclusions.  See People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 
(Cal. 1971). 
 133. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 138. See id. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/9
GREGERSON (CKI &CB&LSK) 11/14/2004  5:41:38 PM 
2004] DANGEROUS, NOT DEADLY 623 
felony-murder.  Current Minnesota law, however, required the 
opposite conclusion.139  Instead of explicitly changing the law, the 
limited reasoning that the court provided in Anderson only served to 
obfuscate what had before been well-settled principles.140 
A. Propriety of Result 
In Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court wisely refused to 
include possession of a stolen firearm and felony possession in the 
list of offenses that can be punished as felony-murder.141  First, the 
court made a critical and just distinction between the use of a 
firearm and the possession of a firearm.142  As the appellant’s brief 
to the court aptly noted, possession of the stolen firearm “did not 
become a special danger to human life until the firearm was 
pointed at Blake Rogers.”143  It required a separate act that cannot 
be fairly characterized as the manner in which the firearm was 
possessed. 
Second, there is a measurable difference between the quality 
of mens rea144 required for second-degree murder (outside of the 
felony-murder context) and that required for the possession 
offenses at issue in Anderson.145  This discrepancy is particularly 
acute where the underlying felony is a “status crime,” based directly 
on a defendant’s commission of a previous crime.146  This 
 
 139. See infra Part IV.B. 
 140. See infra Part IV.C. 
 141. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. 
 142. Id. at 700. 
 143. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 7, Anderson (No. C9-02-1043) (“It is the 
blending of these two concepts (possessing a stolen firearm and placing the 
firearm close to the decedent’s head) . . . that permits the conclusion [that the 
felony was inherently dangerous to human life].”).  The court did not specifically 
address the argument, but its agreement is implicit in the distinction the court 
drew between possession of a firearm and its use.  See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701. 
 144. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 999 (defining “mens rea” as “[t]he state of mind 
that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had 
when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness”). 
 145. In Minnesota, second-degree murder requires “intent.”  See MINN. STAT. § 
609.19, subd. 1 (2002).  Intent “means that the actor either has a purpose to do 
the thing or cause the result specified or believes the act, if successful, will cause 
that result.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2002).  Possession, in contrast, 
requires no particular mental state.  See MINN. STAT. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002) 
(not requiring a specific mens rea). 
 146. A status crime “consists not in proscribed action or inaction, but in the 
accused’s having a certain personal condition or being a person of a specified 
character.”  U.S. v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting 
17
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discrepancy militates against application of the felony-murder 
rule.147  The California Supreme Court argued similarly that it is 
illogical to maintain “that the presence or absence of a felony 
conviction on a person’s past record [could be] the controlling 
factor as to whether a homicide was committed with malice.”148 
Third, the homicide in Anderson was not caused by an act that 
was in furtherance of the felony.  The discharge of the gun did not 
make the gun more stolen or Anderson’s possession less lawful.  
Although Minnesota law has not explicitly articulated such a 
requirement, the application of the felony-murder rule in this case 
would “eliminate[] the proximate cause requirement and allow[] 
the state virtually unlimited discretion to invoke the felony-murder 
rule.”149  Anderson’s use of the gun did nothing to advance his 
unlawful possession.150 
Finally, simply removing possession from the domain of the 
felony-murder rule does not diminish the protections provided 
against use of a firearm.151  Anderson, like other felons who misuse 
firearms, will still be called upon to answer for his actions.152  This 
decision only removes the unwarranted conclusion that Anderson 
intentionally killed Rogers and places that decision back in the 
hands of the jury.153 
Strangely, these substantive arguments were largely ignored 
when the court explained its reasoning.154  In their place, the court 
substituted the conclusion that because the felonies “are not 
dangerous in the abstract” they cannot support a felony-murder 
 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 147. Cf. Reconceptualization, supra note 4, at 1920 (identifying mens rea as a 
traditional focus of the debate on felony murder). 
 148. People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Cal. 1971) (quoting People v. 
Lovato, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).  The court further explained 
that allowing such an illogical conclusion would “constitute an affront to the 
judiciary which through the years has constantly striven to find compelling reasons 
rather than arbitrary distinctions before making rules which result in differing 
treatment of people.”  Id.  Although California employs the abstract test for 
dangerousness, the charge still arises out of defendant’s status as a felon. 
 149. State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (Hudson, 
J., dissenting), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 150. See infra Part IV.D. 
 151. Referring to the remaining third-degree murder charges, the appellate 
court noted, “[O]ur criminal code adequately encompasses the conduct at issue 
here.” Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 375 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 154. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 2003). 
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conviction.155  The court failed to recognize that absence of a 
special danger in the abstract was not fatal under the Nunn 
standard.156  Moreover, in the three cases the court cited in support 
of its conclusion, the lack of danger in the abstract was not 
determinative.157 Instead, the dangerous circumstances under 
which the felonies were committed were acknowledged, and the 
felony-murder rule was applied.158 
B. The Court Misapplied the Law 
Had the court strictly applied the Nunn standard as it had 
previously, the appellate court ruling and the felony-murder charge 
would have been affirmed.  Under the Nunn standard, all of 
Anderson’s actions while possessing the gun can be properly 
considered as part of the underlying felony.159  The Nunn standard 
called for the court to consider “not just the elements of the felony 
in the abstract but the facts of the particular case and the 
circumstances under which the felony was committed.”160 Anderson 
was in possession of the gun at the time it was fired. While 
possession of a gun by a felon in the abstract may not be 
dangerous, it certainly became so when Anderson placed it inches 
from the victim’s head.161 
Applying the same standard that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court purported to apply, the Georgia Supreme Court found 
possession of a firearm by an ex-felon to be inherently dangerous.162  
The Georgia court ruled on similar facts to those involved in 
Anderson, and their decision demonstrates the proper analysis 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980) (describing the 
standard as having dual considerations). 
 157. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (applying the felony-murder 
doctrine despite a lack of danger in the abstract); State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273 
(Minn. 1983) (applying the felony-murder doctrine despite questionable danger 
in the abstract); Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1980) (felony-murder doctrine 
applied despite questionable danger in the abstract). 
 158. Cole, 542 N.W.2d at 53; Back, 341 N.W.2d at 277; Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 754. 
 159. Possession is by nature a “continuing crime.”  See, e.g., People v. Ford, 388 
P.2d 892, 908 (Cal. 1964), overruled by People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1971) 
(determining that possession of a firearm was not dangerous in the abstract). 
 160. The court seems to be implying that the lack of a formula for combining 
both tests leaves open the option to consider either. 
 161. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Minn. 2003) (Gilbert, J., 
dissenting). 
 162. Metts v. State, 511 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. 1999). 
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under the standard.  A felony-murder charge will be upheld in 
Georgia where the underlying felony is “dangerous per se or . . . 
create[s] a foreseeable risk of death when the attendant 
circumstances [are] taken into account.”163  In Metts v. State, the 
defendant, a felon in possession of a firearm, shot the victim 
through a second-story window after twice demanding that the 
person in the window leave.164  The evidence showed that the 
defendant had pointed a cocked and loaded gun at a window 
knowing there was someone on the other side, and thus 
defendant’s possession of a firearm was deemed dangerous and life 
threatening.165  In light of the circumstances, the felony supported 
a felony-murder charge.166 
C. Lack of Guidance 
The Nunn standard calls for two considerations.167  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court utilized only one.168  Either the court 
changed the standard by which it rules upon proper predicate 
felonies, or it failed to explain a major omission within its current 
scheme.  The Anderson court never claimed to be changing the 
Nunn standard.  In fact, the court was extremely clear in its 
insistence that this decision was to follow prior precedent.169  The 
court cited the Nunn standard no less than six times, each time 
maintaining that the standard called for consideration of the felony 
both in the abstract and in the context of its commission.170 
The court specifically stated, “Contrary to the implications set 
forth in the dissent, we are not writing on a clean slate.  We cannot, 
and should not, ignore our precedent interpreting Minnesota’s 
felony-murder statute in order to render an opinion reaching a 
different result.”171  Ironically, the court proceeded to do just that. 
After taking pains to reinvigorate the dual nature of its 
analysis, the court went on to focus singularly upon the unlawful 
 
 163. Id. at 510. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980) (describing the 
abstract and circumstances tests). 
 168. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 169. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 701 (stating that the court is applying the 
“statute as previously interpreted” to the facts of this case). 
 170. Id. at 699-701. 
 171. Id. at 701 n.7. 
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possession in the abstract.  “Applying the statute as previously 
interpreted,” the court held that “[b]ecause felon in possession of a 
firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are not dangerous in the 
abstract, these predicate felonies fail the special danger to human 
life standard.”172  The omission was particularly glaring in light of 
the appellate court’s reliance upon the circumstances as the basis 
for its holding173 and Justice Gilbert’s strong dissent emphasizing 
the same.174 
D. Alternative Reasoning 
The court should have taken the opportunity presented by the 
facts in Anderson to change its existing law.  Had the court desired 
to create a standard to further limit the felony-murder rule in a 
substantive way, the court should have expressly required that the 
homicide be committed in “furtherance of the felony.”175  The 
change would have properly enabled the court to avoid charging 
Anderson with felony-murder and would have provided a clear and 
sustainable guide for future decisions. 
The recognition of such a limitation would require a tighter 
causal nexus between the felony and the homicide.176  The resulting 
death must be “a consequence [of an] action which was directly 
intended to further the [predicate] felony.”177  While the 
requirement has most often been used in situations involving 
deaths caused by a third party,178 it has also been applied to deaths 
caused by acts that were not “part of the criminal enterprise.”179 
 
 172. Id. at 701. 
 173. See State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 666 
N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 174. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 175. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 937 P.2d 310, 319 (Ariz. 1997) (“A death is in 
furtherance of an underlying felony,” for purposes of felony murder, “if the death 
resulted from an action taken to facilitate accomplishment of the felony.”). 
 176. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 70 (2004) (“The death need not be in 
furtherance of the felony, but the act that caused the death should be in 
furtherance of the felony.”). 
 177. King v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 704, 708 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).  “In 
short, whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the 
homicide depends on whether the defendant’s felony dictated his conduct which 
led to the homicide.”  Griffin v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E.2d 653, 658 (Va. 2000) 
(citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (1998)). 
 178. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977). 
 179. King, 368 S.E.2d at 706. King provides a clear illustration of this principle. 
Two men flew a plane containing over 500 pounds of marijuana.  Id. at 705.  Due 
to heavy fog, the pilot had his companion take control of the airplane while he 
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It would be difficult to argue that the discharge of the firearm 
in Anderson was “integral to the felony, or in direct furtherance of 
or necessitated by the felony.”180  This argument constituted much 
of the appellate court dissent in Anderson.181  Judge Hudson 
objected to the appellate court ruling, arguing that “the discharge 
of the gun, the act causing Rogers’ death, was not committed in 
furtherance of the underlying felony of unlawful possession.”182  
The appellate majority recognized that “[Anderson] did not 
commit the murder to further any of the underlying felonies,” but 
did not find the consideration to be determinative.183 
The requirement would have proceeded naturally from recent 
Minnesota decisions working with the felony-murder rule.184  In 
Nunn, the homicide was caused by a physical beating that was 
administered in an attempt to complete a burglary.185  In Back, the 
same firearm shots that caused the felony damage to property also 
caused the homicide.186  The defendant in Cole intentionally shot a 
police officer to avoid arrest for his felony theft.187  Anderson did 
not use the firearm to further his unlawful possession.  Finally, 
comparing the unlawful possession in Anderson to the dangerous 
theft in Cole, the dissenting judge pointed out that “Cole purposely 
shot the police officer to evade arrest; here [Anderson] 
accidentally shot the victim.”188 
Instead of attacking the problem directly and requiring a 
tighter causal nexus between the felony and the resulting death, 
the Anderson court simply ignored the dangerous circumstances 
portion of its analysis and evaluated the possession in the abstract 
 
attempted to navigate.  Id.  The plane hit a mountain, and the companion died.   
Id.  As a result, defendant was charged with felony murder based on possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute.  Id.  The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that 
the crash was not a foreseeable result of the felony nor made more likely by the 
fact that the plane cargo was illegal.  Id. at 708. 
 180. Id. at 708. 
 181. See State v. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 367, 372-75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(Hudson, J., dissenting), rev’d, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 374. 
 183. Id. at 371. 
 184. Id. at 374 (suggesting that the “in furtherance” requirement was adhered 
to in Cole and Back). 
 185. State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 752 (Minn. 1980). 
 186. State v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 274 (Minn. 1983). 
 187. Anderson, 654 N.W.2d at 374 (discussing State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 
(Minn. 1996)). 
 188. Id. at 375. 
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alone.189 
V. CONCLUSION 
In recognizing the abstract test as capable of standing alone 
and according it determinative weight, the court effectively added a 
new tool to its capacity to control which felonies may be utilized for 
conviction under the felony-murder doctrine.190  Having recognized 
both the abstract and the circumstances test, without constraining 
itself with a standard for reconciling them, the court had only to 
choose between them to determine the outcome.191  By focusing 
singularly on the abstract test in Anderson, the court made its 
judgment that neither felony is a proper predicate for felony-
murder, but left the lower courts with very little guidance on how 
and when to duplicate its reasoning.192 
The Minnesota Supreme Court did come to the correct result 
in Anderson by declining to allow a charge of second-degree felony-
murder.  Rather than changing the law in Minnesota, the court 
simply reinterpreted its prior precedent, leaving several issues 
unaddressed.193  Foremost among them is the scope of the court’s 
holding.  Although the court has limited the immediate scope of its 
holding to felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen 
firearm, the court offered little explanation for what it had done.194  
Because the court has yet to prescribe a rule for the interaction of 
the abstract and the circumstances tests, lower courts will 
temporarily find themselves with greater decision-making power 
and less guidance for using it. 
 
 
 189. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Had the majority taken the dissent’s broader view of the felony, the court 
could easily have found the requisite danger.  In particular, the dissent faults the 
majority for overlooking the “realities of the situation” and declared that “[t]his 
case involves exactly the inherently dangerous situation the legislature 
envisioned.”  Id. at 702 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See supra Part IV.B. 
 194. See Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003). 
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